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RALPH S. TYLER* & KAREN STAKEM HORNIG**
Reflections on State Regulation: A Lesson of the
Economic Turmoil of 2007-2009
THE COLLAPSE OF THE HOUSING, CREDIT, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS in the United
States in 2007-2009 will produce, as it should, a re-examination of the nation's
regulatory structure.! The question "how did this happen?" naturally leads to the
question "how can we avoid a repeat?" The scope of the collapse-starting with the
decline of overpriced and over-mortgaged homes, and extending through invest-
ment banks, savings and loans, and insurance companies-certainly indicates that
there was no single cause and thus, there is no single cure.2 Our nation experienced
a massive systemic failure (the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression
as we have so often been told); it will take extensive systemic, regulatory corrective
actions to reduce the likelihood of repetition.3
Developing a comprehensive list of all the logically necessary corrective actions is
beyond the scope of this article and well beyond the competence of the authors.
The relevant limited area in which we claim experience is state regulation of insur-
ance. We propose, therefore, to look at recent economic events through that prism.
In doing so, perhaps some useful lessons of broader applicability will be learned.
Insurance Commissioner, Maryland Insurance Administration.
Associate Deputy Commissioner, Maryland Insurance Administration. The opinions, beliefs and
viewpoints expressed by the authors are not official policies of the Maryland Insurance Administration and do
not necessarily reflect the opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints of the Administration of the State of Maryland.
1. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It is Time to Regulate Over-The-Counter
Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338339 (last
modified Feb. 5, 2009) (stating that credit default swaps "magnified and contributed to [the] market failure
that began in the latter half of 2008f,]" before "examin[ing] the regulation of instruments similar to credit
default swaps and conclud[ing] that credit default swaps should be regulated as well"); John Patrick Hunt,
Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit Crisis": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform,
and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1267625 (last modified Jan. 25, 2009) (criticizing a number of reform efforts aimed at credit rating
agencies and advocating a solution to the credit rating incentive problem that would require credit rating
agencies to give up profits earned by a rating that is proved by the product's performance over time to have
been a low-quality rating).
2. See David Anderson, The Credit Crisis, 72 TEx. B.J. 24, 24-25 (2009).
3. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008,
at Al.
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Our nation's current system of economic regulation is a complex hodge-podge
of federal and state agencies.' Consistent with the American aversion to central
planning of the economy, the system is intentionally diffuse.5 There is no single
regulator of the United States economy.6 With respect to regulation of the domestic
insurance industry, the states (plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands) are the dominant regulators.7 An important qualification to
this description involves health care, where the federal government plays an impor-
tant regulatory role, through Medicare and by preempting state regulation of large
employers' self-funded plans.'
We wish to make clear our perspective, if not bias. We are state insurance regula-
tors. We see each day the strengths of the state regulatory system and its benefits to
Maryland consumers. We work to improve and strengthen the weaknesses of our
state's insurance regulatory system. Our overall view is that the state system of
insurance regulation has served the country well in the past and did so again in the
turmoil of 2007-2009.'
We would caution against learning the wrong lessons from the present turmoil.
While better and more thoughtful regulation is needed, that conclusion should not
be equated automatically with exclusive or primary federal regulation."l The federal
regulatory system, with its responsibilities for securities and banking, for example,
has not distinguished itself in the current crisis.1' State regulation of insurance dur-
ing this same period looks quite good by comparison. 2 We caution strongly against
discarding that which worked because so much else failed.
The goal of insurance regulation is to promote the welfare of the public by en-
suring fair contracts at fair prices from financially strong companies." Regulation is
intended to prevent market failures, including financial insolvency of insurance
companies and unfair treatment of insurance consumers. 4 These dual goals of as-
4. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 32,
44 (2008) (hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.
pdf.
5. See id. at 2.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 61.
8. Peter J. Hammer, Competition and Quality as Dynamic Processes in the Balkans of American Health
Care, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 473, 477 (2006).
9. See infra Part Ill.
10. For an argument proposing primary federal regulation, see TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 10.
11. John C. Coffee, SEC's New Rules Fail to Address Key Rating Issues, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 15, 2009, at 5.
12. Jim Connolly, Blame Feds, Not States for AIG Mess, Regulators Contend, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. &
CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 29, 2008, at 7, 7, 32.
13. Karen Pollitz et al., New Directions in Health Insurance Design: Implications for Public Policy and Prac-
tice, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUpp.), Winter 2003, at 60, 61.
14. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 63--64.
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suring insurer solvency and fair treatment of consumers include availability and
affordability of insurance. 5
The discussion that follows is in three parts. We first provide some brief back-
ground and legal history of how it came to pass that states have been, and are, the
dominant, albeit not the sole, regulators of the insurance industry. 6 The second
section discusses how we have seen the economic problems of 2007-2009 impact
the insurance industry. 7 The third and- final section argues thatthe strengths of the
state regulatory system are substantial and well worth preserving, recognizing a
need for continued improvement. "
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The business of insurance is a significant economic driver in the economy on a
global, national, and local level. 9 By the end of calendar year 2006, insurance com-
panies in the United States held assets of $6 trillion. °
A. History of the Insurance Industry
The concept of insurance has deep roots. There is strong evidence of early forms of
bonds and benevolent societies in China, India, Egypt, Greece, and Rome." During
the Middle Ages, the concept of commercial insurance grew throughout Europe
with maritime insurance contracts becoming common place in Italy.12 The first set
of insurance regulations, known as the "law merchant," developed to expedite in-
21ternational commerce.
Insurance as we know it in the West today traces its roots back to 16th and 17th
century England.24 With the growth of exploration, international trade, and the
boom of urban centers, the need for marine and fire insurance grew. 25 Edward
Lloyd opened a coffee house in London in the late 1680s that was frequented by
ship owners, businessmen, and sailors. 26 It became a meeting place for those seek-
ing to have their ships and inventories insured. 27 "This early marine insurance was
15. Robert W. Minto, Captives and RRG's in the Reinsurance Environment, in REINSURANCE LAW & PRAC-
TICE 2006: NEw LEGAL & BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 837, 939 (Practis-
ing L. Inst., 2006).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 126 (commenting on the role of insurance in safeguarding the
assets of consumers and businesses in the overall economy).
20. Id.
21. WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 8 (Buist M. Anderson ed., 3d ed. 1951).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 11.
24. Id. at 14-15.
25. See id. at 17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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issued by individuals . .. [and t]hose who agreed to accept a portion of the risk
wrote their names under the description of the risk and terms of agreement."2I This
practice gave rise to the common insurance term, "underwriting."29 The devastating
Great Fire of London of 1666 was the impetus for the growth in the fire insurance
business in England. °
In the United States, fire insurance was initially the most popular form of insur-
ance. 1 Some sources give Benjamin Franklin credit for starting America's first in-
surance company when he founded Philadelphia Contributionship for the
Insurance of Houses from Loss by Fire in 1752."2 America's first true fire insurance
company was the Friendly Society of Charleston founded on February 3, 1736 in
Charleston, South Carolina.3' This effort was short-lived, however. Four years later,
in 1740, a destructive fire caused widespread property damage in Charleston and
led to the collapse of the Friendly Society.34
B. Regulation of Insurance in America
As America grew, so did the demand for commercial and personal insurance, and
by the mid-19th century the insurance industry had expanded to include casualty
insurance, accident and health insurance, and life insurance.3" The industry
boomed and so did the demand for its regulation. "As early as 1866 the insurance
trade, though still in its infancy, was subject to widespread abuses."37
States began to pass laws regulating the sale of insurance and forming state in-
surance commissions. 8 The Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) was cre-
ated in 1872."9 As early as 1871, state insurance regulators recognized the need to
work in concert with one another to coordinate regulation and thus created the
28. ARTHUR ANDERSEN, THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1991).
29. Id.; VANCE, supra note 21, at 17-18.
30. VANCE, supra note 21, at 19.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id.; Insurance Information Institute, Insurance 101, http://www.iii.org/media/research/insurancelO1
(last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
33. See Charleston SC History: A Timeline of South Carolina Settlement, Economy, Revolutionary War,
and Civil War, http://www.charlestonscrealestate.us/charlestonhistory.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009); e-Refer-
enceDesk, South Carolina History Timeline: Important Dates, Events, and Milestones, http://www.e-refer-
encedesk.com/resources/state-history-timeline/south-carolina.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
34. Mutual Assurance Society of Virginia, Mutual Assurance-Its Beginning in America, http://www.mu-
tual-assurance.com/newlnsInAmerica.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
35. See VANCE, supra note 21, at 23-35 (explaining the historical progression of these types of insurance in
the United States).
36. See id. at 37 (explaining the early history of state regulation of the insurance business).
37. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 544 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-
Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 22 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006)), as recognized in U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993).
38. See VANCE, supra note 21, at 36.
39. Maryland Insurance Administration, Historical Information, http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa
jsp/aboutMia/HistoricalInfo.jsp (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).4 ° A first major NAIC
initiative "was the development of uniform financial reporting by insurance com-
panies."' Today, the NAIC is made up of the insurance regulators from all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the United States territories. 2
The legal history of insurance regulation in the United States turns on the defini-
tion of interstate commerce as it relates to insurance. 3 In 1868, the Supreme Court
shaped the state-based nature of insurance regulation when it ruled in Paul v. Vir-
ginia that the sale of insurance is not commerce for the purpose of the United
States Constitution's Commerce Clause.'
The Commonwealth of Virginia passed a law in 1866 that "provided that no
insurance company, not incorporated under the laws of the State, should carry on
its business within the State without previously obtaining a license for that purpose
... "4' To obtain a license, the law also required an insurance company to deposit a
bond with Virginia's treasurer.46 Samuel Paul, a citizen of Virginia, was hired by
several New York insurance companies to work as their agent selling insurance in
Virginia.47 Though he applied for a Virginia license, the companies did not deposit
a bond with Virginia's treasurer.4" Paul was denied a license and the insurance
companies challenged Virginia's action as in violation of the Privileges and Immu-
nities and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. 9
The Paul Court found first that a corporation was not a citizen for the purposes
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." But the part of the ruling that had the
greatest impact on the development of state insurance regulation was the finding,
which stood for nearly eighty years that, "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce."'" The Court found that insurance policies are personal
contracts between the insurance company and the insured, and that even when
they are purchased by a resident of one state from a company domiciled in another
state, the contracts are local in nature. 2 The Court made it clear that regulation of
40. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, About the NAIC: The NAIC's History and Back-
ground, http://www.naic.org/indexabout.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (determining whether the sale of insurance is interstate com-
merce as protected by the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause), abrogated by United States v. Se. Underwrit-
ers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 22 (1945)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006)).
44. Id. at 183.
45. Id. at 168.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 169.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 169-70.
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Id.
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insurance was within a state's purview. 3 "Now, the Federal government can no
more regulate the commerce of a State than a State can regulate the commerce of
the Federal government; and domestic bills or promissory notes are as necessary to
the commerce of a State as foreign bills to the commerce of the Union.5 4
This reading of the Commerce Clause with respect to insurance was reiterated by
the Supreme Court until it was reversed in 1944 in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n.5" The South-Eastern Underwriters Association (SEUA) was in-
dicted under the Sherman Act56 for price fixing and anti-competitive practices in
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. 7 The
SEUA argued that it was not subject to the Sherman Act because insurance is not
commerce for the purpose of the United States Constitution.58
In a deeply researched opinion by Justice Black, the Court reversed Paul v. Vir-
ginia and found that its broad holding that insurance is not commerce was incon-
sistent with the Court's application of the Commerce Clause to other businesses.59
Furthermore, the Court rejected the Paul Court's notion that regulation of com-
merce was either exclusively state or exclusively federal, stating,
[iut is settled that, for Constitutional purposes, certain activities of a business
may be intrastate and therefore subject to state control, while other activities of
the same business may be interstate and therefore subject to federal regulation.
And there is a wide range of business and other activities which, though subject
to federal regulation, are so intimately related to local welfare that, in the
absence of Congressional action, they may be regulated or taxed by the states.6"
The Court concluded that "no commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts
its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory
53. Id.
54. Id. at 184.
55. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Consistent with its assertion in Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court has regularly
recognized that insurance transactions are not to be considered commerce. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County, 231 U.S. 495, 503 (1913) ("These [insurance] contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper
meaning of the word."); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654 (1895) ("Issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce."). The Supreme Court changed its stance in South-Eastern Underwriters, when it
reasoned that "it would indeed be difficult now to hold that no activities of any insurance company can ever
constitute interstate commerce so as to make it subject to such regulation .... " 322 U.S. at 550.
56. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(2006)).
57. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 534-35.
58. Id. at 536.
59. Id. at 548 (noting that despite the assertion made in Paul, the Supreme Court has consistently recog-
nized that "certain activities of a business may be intrastate and therefore subject to state control, while other
activities of the same business may be interstate and therefore subject to federal regulation") (internal citations
omitted).
60. Id.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
RALPH S. TYLER & KAREN STAKEM HORNIG
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of
the business of insurance." 1
In response to the South-Eastern decision, Congress in 1945 passed the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act that acknowledged the federal government's right to regulate in-
surance as interstate commerce, but agreed that the federal government would not
exercise this right as long as the industry was regulated adequately by the states.62
The debate about state versus federal regulation of insurance has continued over
the last several decades as the political winds shifted in favor of industry and
against regulation, with the culmination, in 1999, of the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act).63 The purpose of the GLB Act was to facilitate affilia-
tion among banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.64 While preserving
much of state insurance regulation, the GLB Act was designed to "eliminate[ I
many Federal and State law barriers to affiliations among banks and securities
firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers . . . [and] pro-
vide[] financial organizations with flexibility in structuring these new financial af-
filiations through a holding company structure, or a financial subsidiary .... "65
The Act set the stage for corporate structures that blended traditional insurance
business with other, higher risk financial services.66
In recent years, Congress has been urged by large insurers to enact legislation
authorizing an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) for insurers.67 Similar to the system
that exists in banking, an OFC would permit insurers to choose between state and
61. Id. at 553.
62. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(2006)).
63. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Matthew J. Restrepo, The Convergence of Commercial and Investment
Banking Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Revisiting Old Risks and Facing New Problems, 11 L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 269, 270-72 (2005). The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 and it "acted to prevent commercial banks
from underwriting most types of securities and from affiliating with investment banking firms." Id. at 271. "In
1987, the [Federal Reserve Boardj FRB[,] approved securities activities in non-bank subsidiaries of Bank Hold-
ing Companies" with some limitations, an obvious departure from the Glass-Steagall Act's separation of com-
mercial and investment banking. Id. The FRB stipulated that as long as a certain percentage of the revenue
earned by a firm engaging in underwriting was not derived from bank-ineligible activities, a commercial bank
was free to affiliate with them. Id. The FRB originally set the revenue limitation at 5%, however this cap rose
dramatically to 25% by 1989. Id. at 272. "This trend of the softening of certain Glass-Steagall restrictions, by
federal regulators, came to a dramatic climax in 1999 when Congress passed the [Gramm- Leach-Bliley] Act
.. " Id.
64. H.R. REP. No. 106-434, at 127 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
65. Id.
66. See generally Restrepo, supra note 63, at 273 (noting that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act eliminated the
protections that the Glass-Steagall Act had in place to restrict commercial banks from getting involved with
risky services such as underwriting and anti-competitive activities).
67. See Senators Introduce Optional Federal Charter Legislation, INs. J., Apr. 5, 2006, available at http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/04/05/67081.htm (noting that "[tlhe Council of Insurance
Agents & Brokers, which represents large commercial property/casualty domestic and international commercial
insurance brokers, supports the optional federal charter system").
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federal regulation.68 While recognizing the need for greater uniformity among
states, generally smaller companies and insurance agents have supported continu-
ing state-based regulation.69
II. THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN OF 2007-2009
ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. National and International Impact
In September 2008, the economic crisis erupted in earnest on Wall Street and the
Federal Reserve stepped in to prop up the American International Group (AIG),
"the world's largest insurance company." AIG's financial investment subsidiaries
were heavily involved in issuing high-risk derivatives contracts.7' The goal of the
Federal Reserve was to step in and oversee what it thought would be a quick and
orderly sale of AIG's insurance subsidiaries, all of which were considered (and are
still considered) financially strong stand-alone companies.7 2 By mid-October 2008,
the taxpayers were exposed to $1.047 trillion in debt as a result of the financial
crisis and that figure is rising as a result of the federal government's attempt to
stimulate the economy and reverse its decline. 3 As of this writing in early 2009, the
prospect of sales of AIG's insurance subsidiaries is still an unrealized hope.7 4
As the economic crisis spread throughout the economy, the insurance industry
has been impacted by the contraction of available credit and the general decline of
68. Wolcott B. Dunham, Jr. et al., U.S. Insurance Regulation Reform S.2509: National Insurance Act of 2006,
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Oct. 2006, at 10, 12-13 ("An insurer could remain in the state system
and not be subject to federal regulation or an insurer could opt into the federal system and not be subject to
state regulation.").
69. See Peter J. Wallison, Competitive Equity: An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance Companies, FIN.
SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2006, at 1, 2, 4, available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/200603091-fso-g.pdf. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) advocates the interests of small insurers in all fifty states and opposes an optional federal charter
because it believes it can create sufficient uniformity at the state level. Id.
70. See Andrew Clark, US Government Steps in to Rescue Insurance Giant AIG, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 17,
2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/sep/17/marketturmoil.creditcrunch.
71. See Jesse Eisinger, The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room, PORTFOLIO.COM, Oct. 15, 2008, http://
www.portfolio.com/views/columns/wafl-street/2008/10/15/Credit-Derivatives-Role-in-Crash (noting that AIG
was heavily involved in dealing with risky credit-default swaps, a type of derivative contract).
72. See CSAC Excess Insurance Authority, AIG Update--10/20/2008, http://www.csac-eia.org/pdfs/
AIGUpdate_102008.pdf (noting that AIG Commercial Insurance and its subsidiaries remain highly rated as
they hold assets exceeding $70 billion and have a statutory surplus of $26.7 billion).
73. Robert P. Hartwig, Conference Presentation at the Southeastern Regulators Association Conference:
Financial Crisis: Private & Public Sector Impacts Challenges Amid Economic and Regulatory Uncertainty (Oct.
20, 2008) (transcript available at http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/binary/800559_l_0/SERA.pdf).
74. See David S. Hilzenrath, AIG Moving Slowly on Asset Sales to Pay Debt, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at
Dl, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR200901130270l.htm
(noting that market conditions for the sale of AIG's insurance subsidiaries is bleak because the suitable buyers
are also financial services companies that have seen their buying power reduced by dropping stock values).
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investment value.7" Nonetheless, the lesson is that insurance companies that contin-
ued to behave more-or-less like traditional insurance companies-insuring risks
that they understood, meaning the insurer had sound underwriting guidelines and
rational pricing-are, at present, financially sound.76 AIG is strong evidence for
this general proposition." The AIG operating insurance companies are financially
sound.7 This is a testament to effective state regulation of the business of insur-
ance. The problems at AIG that resulted in the initial $85 billion federal bailout
(with more billions thereafter) were at the holding company level where it was
involved in exotic and not well understood transactions.79
B. Impact at the Maryland State Level
Maryland saw firsthand the impact that high risk investments have on insurance
businesses, on a smaller scale, with financial guaranty insurers."0 These "monoline"
firms (often because they provide service to only one industry-financial services)
traditionally insured the timely payment of interest and repayment of principal on
municipal bonds." This was a successful and profitable business.82
Starting in about 2001, monoline insurers began insuring structured finance
products and this transformed into the business of insuring credit default swaps
(CDS) of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities. 3 The buyer of a CDS
receives credit protection and the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthi-
75. See generally David Roche, The Credit Crunch Will Go On, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A25, available
at http://s.wsj.net/article/SB122169266450449841.html (explaining that insurers such as AIG have suffered sig-
nificant losses amidst the current economic downturn and widespread contraction of credit).
76. See S&P Rates Phila. Indemnity, Phila. Insurance; 'AA-'; Outlook Stable, INS. J., Feb. 5, 2009, http://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/02/05/97638.htm (explaining that Philadelphia Indemnity In-
surance Company and its sister company Philadelphia Insurance Company received an AA- financial strength
rating because of their strong competitive position and their valuable "underwriting discipline"); see also Fitch
Affirms Travelers' Ratings; Outlook Stable, Bus. WIRE, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/
home/permalink/?ndmViewld=news yiew&newsld=20090213005704&newsLang=en (noting that Fitch Rat-
ings has rated the insurance subsidiaries of The Travelers Companies, Inc., at AA because it views the compa-
nies' "investment portfolio as a high-quality and liquid portfolio with comparatively little exposure to problem
asset classes such as mortgage backed securities with sub-prime or Alt-A collateral").
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. See id.
79. See Laura Bruce, Have an AIG Policy? Officials Say Don't Worry, BANKRATE.COM, Sept. 17, 2008, http://
www.bankrate.com/brm/news/insurance/insurance-news-AIG-policies-al.asp (stating that AIG involved itself
with derivatives and swaps and in the process guaranteed pools of mortgages without understanding the risks
involved).
80. See Press Release, Md. Ins. Admin., Insurance Commissioner Approves ACA Financial Guaranty Cor-
poration Settlement and Restructuring Plan (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/
sa/documents/ACArelease-final-08-08.pdf (explaining that ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation, a financial
insurance guarantor incorporated in Maryland, has suffered greatly due to the meltdown of the sub-prime
mortgage market).
81. Richard C. Bosse, Jr., Note, Financial Guaranty Insurance: Is It "the Business of Insurance" Under the
McCarran Act?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 855, 856 n.7.
82. Id. at 855-57.
83. Bruce E. Stern, Synthetic Securitization: A Comment on Bell & Dawson, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
567, 567 (2002).
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ness of the product.8 4 Thus, this swap transaction transfers the risk of default from
the holder of the underlying security to the seller of the swap.'5 These swap transac-
tions were not themselves regulated as insurance even though they can be used to
hedge (i.e. insure) against a default.86 The insured CDS allowed otherwise lower-
rated securities to be more highly rated and, therefore, more valuable in the
marketplace. 7
We now know at least three things about these transactions: (1) the underlying
assets (mortgages on homes and ultimately the homes themselves) had far less
value and were far riskier than projected; (2) these transactions were complex and
not well understood; and (3) these transactions were unregulated. 8
Often, these transactions were structured in such a way as to have a devastating
impact on the company's bottom line if things turned sour, as they have. 9 Insurers'
contracts provided that if the insurer was downgraded (as happened), its
counterparties had the right to require it to post additional collateral.98 In Decem-
ber 2007, in anticipation of being downgraded by the rating agencies, a Maryland
domiciled bond insurer entered into a consent order with the MIA providing that,
in the event of the then anticipated downgrade, thereby triggering an obligation to
post about $1.7 billion in additional collateral, and in the absence of forbearance
agreements with all of the insurer's counterparties, the MIA could institute, with-
out objection from the insurer, conservatorship, rehabilitation, or liquidation
proceedings.9'
In fact, the insurer obtained forbearance agreements, which were extended sev-
eral times so no proceedings were commenced.9 2 Ultimately, after months of nego-
tiations, but no litigation, all parties agreed that the insurer would be placed in
runoff.93 The expectation is that the runoff company would be able to satisfy all
84. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2063 (2007).
85. Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 191, 222.
86. See Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a
Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM I. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 173 (2007) (noting that although financial regula-
tors have regulatory authority over CDS's, many market observers believe that they "should qualify as capital
markets products that escape regulation under state law").
87. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV.
1019, 1027-28 (2007) (explaining the role of CDO and CDS in increasing the value of lower-rated securities).
88. Aaron Unterman, Exploring Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HAS-
TINGS Bus. L.J. 77, 89 (2008).
89. See Steven Golick, Canadian Ruling Favors Third-Party Releases, AM. BANK. INST. J., July/Aug. 2008, at
40, 40.
90. Id.
91. Reuters, Extension for Troubled Bond Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/01/22/business/22bond.html?-r= 1 &pagewanted=print.
92. See id.
93. Vikas Bajas, Bond Insurers' Distress Rattles Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/business/19ambac.html.
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policyholder claims.94 MIA's principal interest was protection of policyholders and,
hopefully, this objective was achieved.95
III. THE STRENGTH OF STATE REGULATION
There is an active debate underway in the insurance industry, in Congress, in the
media, and among state legislators and regulators regarding the pros and cons of
the current state-dominated system of insurance regulation as compared to the
asserted benefits of a more federally driven system.96 There are those who insist that
the current state-based system, despite the acknowledged inefficiencies of a system
of fifty plus separate regulatory regimes, has served well the country, its consumers,
and the insurance industry, and, therefore, change in the regulatory structure is not
warranted. There are those who take the polar opposite position and insist that
the current system is, at best, a highly inefficient anachronism ill suited to a global
insurance market, and the solution is to federalize insurance regulation, much as
securities regulation was federalized in the 1930s.9' Not surprisingly, there are many
whose views fall somewhere between these two extremes.99
To fairly weigh these various views, one must consider what parts of the present
structure make sense, meaning they provide protection to consumers without cre-
ating unreasonable inefficiencies, and how the present system could be made more
efficient, through federal intervention or otherwise, without sacrificing protections
for consumers."°° This framework does not tilt the conclusion in favor of perpetu-
ating the present regulatory structure merely because it exists, while recognizing
that some of the most strident attacks on state regulation are motivated by little
more than a self-interested desire to diminish regulation.'
94. See, e.g., id.
95. See id. (stating that a bailout may be a possible solution).
96. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (1999).
97. Meghan M. McAllister, A Quick Fix, But No Real Solution: Why ERISA Preemption Should Not Be
Expanded to Health Plans, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 359, 382-83 (2007).
98. David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 471, 541 (1994).
99. See Danielle F. Waterfield, Insurers lump on Train for Federal Insurance Regulation: Is It Really What
They Want or Need?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 283, 285 (2002).
100. See David G. Stebing, Insurance Regulation in Alaska: Healthy Exercise of a State Prerogative, 10 ALASKA
L. REV. 279, 296 (1993) (noting the dangers of state insurance regulation and emphasizing that Congress must
take an active role in protecting consumers).
101. See Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating "Deregulation" of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichotomization,
Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 109 n.2 (1989) ("Industry self-
interest, as well as self-serving demands by other interest groups, can greatly affect regulation and any reform
in regulation. Regulatory decisions are, afterall, political ones which specific economic interests may vigorously
try to influence because of the impact on their economic well being.").
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A. The Importance of Economic Regulation
The relentless attack on state regulation because it is regulation cannot be underes-
timated. The insurance industry, not unlike other powerful economic interests, op-
poses regulation almost as a matter of religion, except, of course, for those
regulations that are protective of its special interests.' 2 Industries which receive
special tax treatment do not oppose that type of governmental intervention in their
business. 3 The anti-regulation argument is that regulation causes delay and in-
creases cost, delay hurts consumers (as well as the industry), and the increased
costs hurt consumers as they are passed on to the consumer. 4 There is truth in
this argument, but it is far from the whole truth.
The costs of regulation must be compared to the harms that flow from any weak-
ening of regulation.' 0 The most significant-and the most likely-harm if regula-
tion is weak is abuse of consumers.0 6 Those who attack regulation, focusing on its
costs, suggest, at least implicitly, that industry would behave more fairly and
responsibly if there were less regulation. 7 The evidence does not support this
view."' Notwithstanding regulation, business practices, the pressures of profit max-
imization, and obligations to shareholders often lead insurance companies to act
against the interest of their policyholders. 9 Any weakening of regulatory oversight
would skew the balance further to the detriment of consumers."'
102. See generally Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering the McCarran-Ferguson Act's Commerce Clause Limi-
tation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 260 n.24 (2000) (stating that industry support for regulation depends on how
stringent the law may be).
103. Id.
104. See McAllister, supra note 97, at 382.
105. Kenneth E. Spahn, Service Warranty Associations: Regulating Service Contracts as "Insurance" Under
Florida's Chapter 634, 25 STETSON L. REV. 597, 618 (1996).
106. McAllister, supra note 97, at 382.
107. See generally Eliot M. Blake, Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort
Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 429 (1988) (noting that many states have responded to
regulatory inefficiencies, inequities in rates and competition, as well as other market restrictions by implement-
ing deregulation as a more efficient means of insurance governance).
108. See id. ("Implementation of deregulation, however, has not necessarily led to enhancement of regula-
tory goals and actually appears to have encouraged rate hikes."); see also Hellen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards,
Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REv. 314, 314-15
(1990) (noting that "refurbishing" regulatory controls is a better alternative to the unpredictable and often
ineffective strategy of blanket deregulation in the banking industry).
109. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (describing how the insur-
ance company altered company records to make their client appear less culpable, "disregarded the overwhelm-
ing likelihood of liability" in its decision to contest liability, and, after losing at trial, instructed their clients "to
put a for-sale sign on their house"); Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance
Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INs. LJ. 335, 398 (1998) ("In-
surance companies may violate a policyholder's reasonable expectations of coverage for purely financial rea-
sons. This is because insurance companies profit by prolonging a coverage dispute rather than paying a claim-
even when they know the claim is valid.").
110. As it is, the bargaining power of the consumer-the policyholder-is nearly non-existent as compared
to the insurer's leverage. Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979) ("[Tlhe relationship of
insurer and insured is inherently unbalanced; the adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the insurer in a
superior bargaining position."); Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 77 (W. Va. 1986)
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Some have argued that the concept of insurance regulation should be abandoned
in favor of holistic regulation of the financial services industry because the financial
services system has made insurance products increasingly fungible with one an-
other."' Yet, regulators must address head-on whether this trend in the financial
services industry has provided any real benefit to consumers (rather than to com-
panies) and whether the current crisis is not a call to get the system back to basics
and away from the glorification of unique, complex, and arcane products." 2
One clear lesson in dealing with the consumer fall-out from the AIG bailout is
that even sophisticated, well-informed consumers of annuity products were uncer-
tain about the fundamental nature of the product they had purchased." 3 Invest-
ment in insurance and investment in securities are two distinct and fundamentally
different things."' The choices and risks involved with each must be plain to pur-
chasers." 5 Both the insurance industry and the banking and financial services in-
dustry must get back to basics and the federal government should carefully and
honestly examine the role that the passage of the GLB Act" 6 has had on putting
consumers at risk."' The GLB Act eliminated many of the depression era barriers
("[T]he bargaining power of an insurance carrier vis-a-vis the bargaining power of the policyholder is disparate
in the extreme.").
111. Elizabeth F. Brown, The Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance 2 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract= 1008993.
112. See Colbert I. King, Back to Basics in Banking, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2008, at A19 ("[L]awmakers and
regulators should consider restoring the wall between commercial banks and investment banks that was pulled
down in 1999 by a Congress and White House that were sold a bill of goods by Wall Street .... [Mlake
commercial banks go back to doing what they do best: providing a safe place for people to deposit their
money.").
113. NAELA Annuity Task Force, Annuity Policy: Consumer Protection Issues and Public Policy Recommenda-
tions, 3 NAELA J. 77, 81 (2007) ("Because of the explosion in the use of annuities and the sophistication of the
annuity products which are sold ... there is often a great deal of confusion about what exactly is an annu-
ity.... Even many of the annuity salespeople ... struggle to understand the products they sell.").
114. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 71-73 (1959) (distinguishing insurance
from securities investment based on the "one earmark of insurance," which is the underwriting of risk in
insurance; thus "'insurance' involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of the benefits will be payable in
fixed amounts"). But see Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities
Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 434 (2005)
("[W]e must ask whether this regulatory disparity can be explained other than as an accident of the different
history and public choice input-whether insurance is so different from the gambling, securities investments,
and derivatives investments as to warrant such different regulatory treatment.").
115. See Dorit Samuel, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Will New Regulations Help Avoid Future Financial
Debacles?, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 217, 229 (2009) ("It is intuitively obvious that any method of evaluating return
on an investment must deal with the perceived amount of risk attached to that investment.").
116. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
117. See Ass'n of Banks in Ins. v. Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2001) (intervenor-defendant insur-
ance trade organizations arguing that federal law preemption of state law regulations allows banks to offer
insurance products without requiring them to comply with state consumer protection regulations imposed on
the insurance industry); Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins, Recent Legislation, Financial Services Reform, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 579, 591-92 (2000) (commenting that the GLB Act's"possible consequences include unilat-
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between financial services entities."' Within a relatively short period following the
passage of the GLB Act, the nation has experienced an economic crisis on a dra-
matic scale." 9 There is a cautionary tale there.
B. The Weakness of Federal Regulation
Those who seek structural change in the system of insurance regulation, expanding
the role of the federal government by necessarily contracting the role of the states,
must concede that the recent record of the federal government as a financial regula-
tor has been dismal. 2 ° The most notable and highly publicized regulatory failures
in our lifetimes have been in the housing mortgage industry with follow-on adverse
impacts on banks and other financial institutions. 2' At least in theory, these indus-
tries were (and are) federally regulated.'22 Nothing remotely comparable has oc-
curred in the state regulated insurance industry.'23 This history indicates that
consumer protection at a massive retail level is not something that the federal gov-
ernment has shown the capacity to do well.'24 The federal government is simply too
large and too far removed from the daily lives of average citizens to perform this
eral effects that lead to elevated prices and reduced output, and high market concentration, particularly at the
local market level, with adverse effects on individual consumers and small businesses").
118. See supra note 117.
119. In response to the Great Depression, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act one hundred days into the
New Deal. Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First Century, 25 YALE J. ON
REG. 315, 317 (2008). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. at 318. The GLB Act,
also known as the Federal Financial Modernization Act, was signed into law in November, 1999. N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 111 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The purpose underlying the GLBA is 'to enhance
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for the affiliation of banks,
securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial service providers ....' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106-
434, at 245 (1999) (Conf. Rep.))). Beginning in 2006, "hundreds of thousands of homeowners, many forced by
foreclosure, have moved out of single-family homes into rental housing, creating an excess of approximately
600,000 vacant, largely investor-owned single-family units for sale." Alan Greenspan, We Will Never Have a
Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/edbdbcf6-f360-1ldc-b6bc-
0000779fd2ac.html?nclick check=l ("The current financial crisis in the US is likely to be judged in retrospect
as the most wrenching since the end of the second world war.").
120. See Charles Keenan, A New Balance of Power, BANK DIRECTOR, July 2008, at 30, available at http://
www.bankdirector.com/issues/articles.pl?article id=1195 (calling the Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure "an attempt to address the shortcomings of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley" Act-shortcomings
that led to "mortgage lenders loosen[ing] underwriting standards, [which set] the stage for the subprime cri-
sis," and rejecting the Blueprint for its plan to increase further federal regulation).
121. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the United States
Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369,
386-87 (2008) (discussing regulatory agencies' failure to better regulate the housing mortgage industry result-
ing in the current financial crisis).
122. Stuart M. Rigot, Non-Traditional Mortgage Products: Does Guidance Effectively Inform Borrowers of
Risk?, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 131, 154 (2007) ("Mortgage brokers ... are far from unregulated and without
oversight-'[t]he [mortgage broker] industry is regulated by seventeen federal laws and numerous state and
federal regulations.'" (alterations in original) (quoting National Association of Mortgage Brokers Frequently
Asked Questions, http:// www.namb.org/namb/FAQsl.asp?SnID=1854943273)).
123. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1987) (discussing the liability insurance crisis of the late 1980s).
124. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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function effectively.'25 The states, by contrast, while certainly not performing these
functions perfectly, do a much better job precisely because they are so much closer
to citizens and their concerns.'26
Because consumer protection is the legitimate goal of insurance regulation, it is
useful to define what this term encompasses.'27 Consumer protection in insurance
regulation seeks to assure that purchasers of insurance products receive the benefit
of the bargain of their purchase of coverage. 2 ' The most basic consumer protection
is financial solvency of insurers.'29 If an insurer is not in business and solvent when
a policyholder makes a claim, the consumer gets no protection. 30 To continue to
provide solvency protection, states must protect zealously their right to review the
financial records of insurers to monitor insurers' solvency.' 3' States should similarly
protect their right to take all appropriate actions to avoid insolvencies.'32
Some yet to be created federal agency could become the new monitor of insurers'
financial solvency.'33 Over time, a federal agency could be established, equipped,
and staffed to perform this function.'34 The question is the wisdom or need of
establishing this function at the federal level when it is a function that states have
125. See Randall, supra note 96, at 664-65 ("Favorable reasons for ... state regulation of the insurance
industry include.., the classic federalist arguments: ... [such as] proximity to the citizenry and to the relevant
issues and increased responsiveness as compared to a distant central administrator .... ").
126. See id. at 686 ("[T]he existing regulatory structures could be dismantled and replaced with federal
regulation, [the] state regulatory failures . . . do not, in themselves, suggest a need for federal regulation").
127. Sean B. Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1559, 1606-07 (2008) ("The goals of insurance regulators are generally consumer oriented, balancing protec-
tions for current and future policyholders against the need for insurers to earn a reasonable profit in order to
keep the industry robust.").
128. Id. at 1607 ("The general objectives of regulators are ensuring that insurance is available and offered at
a fair price, protecting insurance company solvency (which protects insurers as well as policyholders from the




131. Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 726, 754 (1992)
("If the fox could be appointed to guard the chicken coop, then insurers could be relied upon to maintain
adequate reserves without external supervision."). See, e.g., Randall, supra note 96, at 642 (noting that reliance
on annual financial statements filed by insurers was inadequate to ensure solvency and thus in the late 1980s,
several large property and casualty insurers became insolvent).
132. See Karl L. Rubinstein, The Legal Standing of an Insurance Insolvency Receiver: When the Shoe Doesn't
Fit, 10 CONN. INs. L.J. 309, 315 (2004) ("[T]he law considers insurance to be a public asset. The solvency of
insurers is, accordingly, a matter of vital public concern both in regard to preventing insurer insolvencies and
in regard to handling them when they do occur." (footnotes omitted)).
133. See, e.g., Waterfield, supra note 99, at 300 (discussing the Federal Insurance Solvency Act, proposed by
Representative Dingell, which would have established a federal agency, the Federal Insurance Solvency Com-
mission, to unify the solvency standards and regulate insurer solvency). See also Federal Insurance Solvency Act
of 1993, H.R. 1290, 103rd Cong. §§ 101-113 (1993) (discussing the establishment of the Federal Insurance
Solvency Commission).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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performed for a long time, and with considerable success, as evidenced by the small
number of insurance company insolvencies).5
States should be equally zealous in resisting federal preemption in connection
with a state's authority to seek to resolve a claim or dispute between an insurance
carrier and an individual consumer or business. As state regulators, we see the
ineffectiveness of the current system of self-funded health insurance where, thanks
to federal preemption, consumer complaints are beyond the reach of state regula-
tion.'36 Experience confirms that there is no readily available forum for consumers
relegated to the no-man's land created by the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA). 37
One argument in favor of federal regulation is that the industry would be regu-
lated by more competent regulators.13 This argument seems to be greatly under-
mined by the extraordinary regulatory failures highlighted by the nation's current
economic crisis.'39 The federal government's failure to adequately regulate the fi-
nancial and banking sectors could not be in more stark contrast to the state-based
regulation of insurance companies. 40 For the past twenty or so years, the dominant
mode of thinking at the federal level has been unapologetically anti-regulatory. 14
The markets-regulate-themselves view has been discredited deeply by recent
events. 42 Importantly, this stance did not impact the insurance industry, as it did
135. Randall, supra note 96, at 664-65, 686.
136. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More Functional
System, 6 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 30-31 (2007) (noting that "ERISA provides that self-insured plans...
are subject only to ERISA, rather than to state law" and that ERISA "largely removes most regulation states
could propose regarding health insurance plans ... without offering any substantial federal remedies to replace
them").
137. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006) (regulating both employee
pension and benefits plans, including health care). Prior to ERISA's enactment, state law regulated the health
insurance industry. Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow
States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 951 (2000). ERISA contains a broad preemption clause,
interpreted by the courts to preempt "virtually all state regulation of health care benefit plans, not just pension
plans." Id.
138. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 131 (noting that the Treasury's recommends an Office of
National Insurance to federally regulate insurance because it will provide "true national regulatory expertise
and guidance" on the insurance industry).
139. Editorial, Hard Truths About the Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at AI8 (noting the current eco-
nomic crisis is a result of a failure of the government to regulate market players and the Bush administration's
belief that "the market, with its invisible hand, works best when it is left alone to self regulate and self correct");
Bernard Yeung, Failures on Many Fronts, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.sghousing.
com/2008/10/01/failures-on-many-fronts/.
140. See Franklin W. Nutter, The Insurance Wars: The Battle Over McCarran-Ferguson, THE BRIEF, Winter
1989, at 10, 14-15 (while state regulation results in "tailored responses to local insurance problems," federal
regulation of banking and securities industries has failed to deter bank failures and insider trading,
respectively).
141. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 62-63 (in 1945 Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act giv-
ing states regulatory jurisdiction over "the business of insurance," while exempting insurance from federal
antitrust law, and in 1999 passed the Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act reaffirming state insurance regulation).
142. See Hard Truths About the Bailout, supra note 139.
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finance and banking, because insurance has been regulated at the state level.'43 This
is not to say that political pressure is not brought to bear upon regulation at the
state level, but because of the great diversity among and between states, states re-
sisted weakening of regulation.'44
Many point to the lack of uniformity among state regulations as an inherent evil
that "can lead to inefficiencies and undue regulatory burden, and can directly limit
insurers' ability to compete across state boundaries and international borders."'45
Given the dramatic growth in the insurance industry in the last fifty years, there
seems to be little evidence of insurers' inability to compete.'46 Viewed more
broadly, one can see advantages to the deliberate state regulatory approach espe-
cially when viewed through the experience of the current economic crisis.'47 One
cost of speed to market can be protection of the consumer. 4 ' A major contributing
factor to the current economic crisis was that companies began to engage in com-
plex and high-risk business practices such as credit default swaps, which few ques-
tioned and fewer understood. Inquiry tended to begin and end with the short-term
positive impact that a particular business practice had upon profits. 9 The trade-off
is that the investor/consumer is more exposed in our current situation, with devas-
tating consequences to individuals, governments, non-profit organizations, and
businesses, large and small.'5 ° Notably, insurance companies were not in the eye of
this storm.'' State regulation-with all of its complexity-results in insurance
143. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents, Insurance Industry Remains Stable During Financial
Crisis, Thanks to State Regulation (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://pianet.com/NewsCenter/PressReleases/10-
3-08.htm (stating that state regulation of insurance is a success in the current economic crisis because "'state
insurance regulators got it right at the same time that federal regulators' experiments with 'self-regulation'
failed to properly supervise the most fundamental activities of banks and securities firms").
144. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 14 (noting that "political favoritism" affects state insurance commission-
ers, but that a lack of uniformity in regulation among the states is a strength).
145. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 126.
146. See id. (noting that states have primarily regulated insurance for over 135 years and the insurance
industry constitutes a large part of the U.S. financial sector with U.S. insurers holding assets totaling $6 trillion
in 2006).
147. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents, supra note 143 (noting the strength of insurance
industry during the economic crisis stems from conservative and prudent state regulation).
148. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 68-69 (recognizing that state insurance regulators sometimes
take several years to ensure consumer protection before approving new products, as opposed to a couple of
months for federally regulated securities products, so the NAIC attempted to use uniform national standards to
institute more "speed to market" with insurance policy form approval).
149. See Gretchen Morgensen, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, A Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2008, at Al (showing that credit default swaps, intended to diminish risk and spread prosperity, were often
beyond the understanding of executives selling them).
150. See id. (suggesting that failure to adequately understand the credit derivatives for the purpose of mak-
ing quick money resulted in the falling of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and is threatening the entire
economy).
151. While AIG is the world's largest insurance company, it was in fact its financial services arm and not
any of its wholly-owned insurance companies that undermined the solvency of the company. Mary Williams
Walsh, With Fed's $85 Billion Loan, A.IG. Starts to Calculate a Measured Sell-Off, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 2008, at
Cll.
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
REFLECTIONS ON STATE REGULATION
companies behaving in a more conservative and deliberate manner.'5 2 What state
regulation lacks in speed to market, it makes up for in the long-term protection of
customers and the companies themselves.'53
C. Where Uniformity is Needed
While the state-based insurance regulatory system has a proven track record and
has the advantage of proximity to citizens, the current system is not defensible
when it imposes protectionist barriers to market entry without generating compen-
sating benefits in the form of consumer protections."4 The state-by-state licensing
of insurance producers fits this description.55 States have made commendable pro-
gress toward uniformity and reciprocity in the area of producer licensing through
the NAIC. s6 Absent federal intervention, however, there is no reasonable likelihood
that states will achieve, in the foreseeable future, a seamless nationwide producer
licensing system. 7 Tellingly, there are few who would argue that the costs and
inefficiencies of the present non-unitary system are equaled, let alone outweighed,
by any identifiable advantages."'
Uniform federal standards (which the NAIC has been moving toward, arguably
at too slow a pace) could and should be enforced by the already existing state
regulatory structure."' The problem with the dual regulatory structure that would
result from the OFC-i.e., some insurance companies would be regulated by the
states and some by the federal government-is the risk that consumer protection
152. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents, supra note 143 ("America's insurance consumers
have been well protected and insurance companies remain stable and sound in the current financial turmoil
thanks to fiscally prudent regulatory oversight by state insurance reglators .... ").
153. See id. (asserting that although some argue that federal regulation of the insurance industry would
make it more efficient, prudent state regulation has ensured the industry's soundness and stability).
154. See Brown, supra note 111, at 6 (noting that the significant time and money expenditures in getting
licensed as an insurance provider create barriers in entering the insurance industry, thus protecting current
providers from competition and driving up costs for consumers).
155. "Insurance producer" is a person who, "for compensation, sells, solicits, or negotiates insurance con-
tracts ... ." MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 1-101(u)(1) (West 2009). Licensing and post-licensing requirements vary
between states. Brown, supra note 111, at 5.
156. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 68.
157. See id.; Brown, supra note 111, at 5-6 (recognizing that each state has different definitions of "insur-
ance," as well as different licensing and post-licensing requirements, which proposed federal regulation strives
to make uniform).
158. See Brown, supra note 11, at 3 & n.3 (showing that some insurance associations support federal
regulation of insurance because the current state-regulated system is costly and cumbersome).
159. Waterfield, supra note 99, at 307 (suggesting that smaller insurance agents believe that states have and
will continue to implement reform "when given a little incentive by the federal government through the use of
national insurance standards").
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would get lost." The focus on service to and protection of the consumer is the
foundation of state regulation.6 '
Furthermore, the OFC does not solve the problem of uniformity of regulation.162
Depending upon how the political winds blow, federally chartered insurance com-
panies could get a wink and a nod while state regulated insurers would be subject
to more stringent regulation putting smaller, more localized companies at a com-
petitive disadvantage.'63 It is not in the best interest of consumers or of the market-
place in general to disadvantage smaller companies." In fact, the opposite should
be true. 6 ' While we are in a global marketplace, the recent economic crisis high-
lights the risks inherent when companies become "too big to fail" and are too far
removed from their customers.'66 We have learned, for example, that mortgage fi-
nance companies were unconcerned about the level of risk being assumed by a
buyer because that company did not hold that paper for long and, therefore, did
not bear that risk.'67 These arrangements increased dramatically the likelihood of
risky and, frankly, unfair business practices. 6 ' The small insurance producer that is
committed to a particular community or state and understands the consequences
of failing to serve its customers' needs serves an important role in the
marketplace.'69
Those who wish to preserve the core of state insurance regulation should be the
leading advocates for federal reform of those parts of the system where an absence
of uniformity creates inefficiencies without providing tangible benefits to consum-
160. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Ins. Agents, supra note 143 (noting lawmakers considering
federal regulation of the insurance industry should consider that state regulation has ensured protection for
consumers despite contradictory language in the insurance policies themselves).
161. See Hazen, supra note 114, at 432 (stating that "the consumer-protection impetus is underscored by
state insurance regulation," which construes policies in favor of the consumer and requires most insurance
policies, especially those marketed to consumers, to be approved by state regulators).
162. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 128 (stating that the suggested Optional Federal Charter gives
insurance companies the option of choosing between federal and state regulation, rather than a unitary
system).
163. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 14-15 (proposing that federal regulation could result in the consolida-
tion of smaller, domestic insurers that are unable to compete with large competitors, which can more easily
deal with a federal regulatory agency).
164. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. CoLo. L. REV. 139, 151-52 (2005)
(describing the unequal bargaining power possessed by small businesses).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, The Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at
Al (discussing the creation of AIG Financial Products and the events leading up to its collapse); Brady Dennis
& Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at Al (describing AIG Financial
Products' involvement in credit-default swaps, the risks involved in the financial products, and mistakes made
by the company that led to its collapse); Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone,
WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at Al (describing the current economic
meltdown).
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. See Hecht, supra note 127, at 1606-07 (stating that a goal of insurance regulation is to balance the
needs of the consumer with the viability of the insurer).
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ers. 7 ° Federal legislation to achieve uniformity in producer licensing, without an
adverse financial impact on states and without diminishing a state's non-discrimi-
natory use of its disciplinary authority over licensees, should be welcomed. 7' Simi-
lar support should be voiced for proposals such as the one to establish an Office of
Insurance Information within the United States Department of the Treasury.'72
State insurance regulation is not undermined by the federal government's increas-
ing its understanding of the national and global insurance market.'73
Some of the opposition to any expansion of federal activity in the field of insur-
ance is prompted by the fear that once the federal nose gets under the tent the
entire camel will follow.'74 There are a number of flaws in this line of argument.
First, and perhaps most obviously, this argument incorrectly posits a total absence
of federal activity in insurance at present.'75 While state regulation is, in fact, the
dominant mode of insurance regulation, it is not the exclusive mode.'76 Medicare,
our national health insurance system for persons over sixty-five, is ample proof that
the federal government is already a major player in the area of health insurance.'77
Moreover, the absolutist position also incorrectly suggests that states have some
unconditional "right" to be the principal regulators of insurance and that the fed-
eral government would be acting improperly by infringing upon the states' "rights"
in this area. 7 As discussed above, the Supreme Court settled this issue long ago in
favor of federal authority.'79 The fact that Congress has, to a great extent, allowed
states to be the principal regulators of insurance should not be equated with the
states having some "right" to do so.' In the end, the case for state regulation must
170. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 14-15,
171. See id. at 10, 14; Robert Rusbuldt, Insurance Regulatory System in 'Desperate' Need of Repair, THE HILL,
Sept. 20, 2006, http://thehill.com/op-eds/insurance-regulatory-system-in-desperate-need-of-repair-2006-09-
20.html (stating the shortcomings of the current insurance regime and requesting a new policy).
172. Insurance Information Act of 2008, H.R. 5840, 110th Cong. (2008).
173. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 126-30 (discussing the state's involvement in insurance regula-
tions and how federal regulations would increase uniformity and efficiency).
174. Patrick Basham, Op-Ed., Political Perils of Overregulation: Big Government and the Financial Crisis,
WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 2008, at A23 (describing how overregulation leads to more regulation).
175. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Profl Ins. Agents, supra note 143 (stating that there is currently little
existing federal insurance regulatory authority).
176. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 10, 14-15.
177. Robert D. Atkinson & Daniel D. Castro, A National Technology Agenda for the New Administration, 11
YALE iL. & TECH. 190, 206 (2009) ("The federal government is the single largest health care payer in the United
States spending over $600 billion annually on eighty million Americans through programs such as Medicare
.... .).
178. See Robert L. Redding, Jr., Insurance Regulation: State vs. Federal Debate Continues, AUTOINc., Dec. 13,
2003, http://www.asashop.orglautoinc/dec2003/legis.htm (quoting Sen. John McCain who articulated that the
state and federal systems need to work together in regulating insurance).
179. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 592-93 (1944) ( "Congress ... [may] take
insurance regulation into the federal system, may formulate and announce the whole scope and effect of its
action in advance, fix a future effective date, and avoid all the confusion, surprise, and injustice which will be
caused by the action of the Court.").
180. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).
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be based on a demonstration that state regulation adds value, not unnecessary bar-
riers, and cannot legitimately be based on some claimed "right."''
Macro global economic forces are driving-and, indeed, should drive-insur-
ance industry representatives and thoughtful policymakers to examine our current
system to identify inefficiencies and to look for solutions to protect, if not enhance,
the competitive position of the United States."2 These macro forces coupled with
the current crisis will produce, in the not distant future, changes in the present
system. 3 The question for states is not if change is coming, but how dramatic that
change will be and whether states will participate in the design of the new system.
The fiscal elephant in the room of any discussion about altering states' regulatory
authority is the enormous amount of insurance premium tax that states collect."4
Even in flush economic times, which these are not, no state is going to be support-
ive of a change that reduces a significant source of state revenue. States should
acknowledge that preserving their opportunity to impose and collect premium tax
is of overriding importance.'
The relative effectiveness of the absolutist "just say no" tactic as a response to the
call for greater federal involvement as compared to the tactic of constructive en-
gagement in the reform debate is not knowable.' This is a question of political
judgment on which reasonable people can disagree. The rejectionist position is
premised on the theory that the best offense is an unyielding defense. 7 The alter-
native constructive engagement approach starts from the perspective that change is
inevitable, and even desirable, and the goal is to preserve the core of state regula-
tory authority.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, our view is that change in the field of insurance regulation is both
inevitable and desirable, and states will be left behind and insurance consumers
will be disadvantaged if state insurance regulators oppose all efforts to broaden the
181. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 14 (describing the benefits of state insurance regulation).
182. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 126-27 ("The lack of regulatory uniformity in the United States
in a time of increasing convergence and globalization has caused many insurers to question the effectiveness
and efficacy of state insurance regulation. This has led some to express concerns . . . [regarding] insurers'
competitive innovations . .
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Sidney D. Watson et al., The Road from Massachusetts to Missouri: What Will it Take for Other
States to Replicate Massachusetts Health Reform? 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1331, 1361 (2007) (stating that Missouri
collects a 2% tax on all insurance premiums, with the exception of health insurance).
185. See, e.g., id. ("Missouri could also raise $155 million in revenue by imposing a 2% tax on health
insurance policies sold in the state").
186. See Nutter, supra note 140, at 33-34 (stating that "Ipiroponents of change have not made their case,"
and thus, the insurance industry should continue to be regulated by the states).
187. See, e.g., TREASURY REPORT, supra note 4, at 126-31 (proposing federal regulation of the insurance
industry to create greater efficiency and uniformity among the states).
188. Linda B. Tigges, Note, Functional Regulation of Bank Insurance Activities: The Time Has Come, 2 N.C.
BANKING INST. 455, 486-87 (1998) ("IF]uture legislative change is inevitable.").
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role of the federal government in insurance regulation. States should defend that
which is important and defensible while bending on issues where a practice does
not yield tangible benefits to consumers and, instead, serves principally to protect
parochial interests.
The change in the world of insurance regulation that is coming will carry with it
elements of pain and discomfort and, ultimately, a new set of problems. The pain
and the problems will be diminished, and the benefits of greater uniformity
through federal standards in certain areas will be maximized if those who believe
that consumer protection is the reason for state insurance regulation are clear
about what they are seeking to preserve and why it is worth preserving.
Finally, it is worth remembering that economic incentives, the need to innovate,
and the drive for higher profits will always mean that market forces will be more
nimble and move more quickly than regulatory forces. The regulatory system will
always be a step or three behind the market. But we need to attempt to keep pace.
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